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Mr. Edwards: Barry Eichengreen said this is the issue that most
concerns policymakers and analysts at this time. Let me just make a
couple of points. The first one is to clarify the nature of the exercise
in my paper. I was asked to look at whether there is any lesson that
one can learn from the world experience for the United States. My
answer to that has four parts.
The first one is every model—or most models I have looked at or
worked with, including my own model in the forthcoming issue of
the Brookings panel—suggests that the current situation is unsustain-
able, and there is a possible scenario (we don’t know the exact
probability) where the United States will have to go through a very
large, significant current account reversal. That is number one.
The second question is, Has this ever happened before in the rest
of the world? The answer is yes.
Number three: What were the consequences of similar adjustments?
I have answered that in my paper.
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289And number four: How useful are these results for the case of the
United States? My answer—and Eichengreen picked up on that—is
not that useful because these are not very large countries. 
I think Cathy Mann’s analysis picks up precisely here in a very useful
way, and she undertakes an exercise that is extremely different in
nature. She goes at the macro relationships and looks at the demand
and supply for cars, motorcycles, pickup trucks, and parts, and
whether Delphi will continue to produce its parts in Michigan or in
Mexico or in China. After going through that kind of analysis in very,
very great detail, her most likely scenario that will “solve” and would
revert the United States to a sustainable path suggests that would result
in a kind of cost, in terms of a short-term growth slowdown, that is
similar to the result that I get from my not-very-useful sample.
Another point that I cannot resist comes from Mann’s discussion,
and that is the large surpluses in the rest of the world that, of course,
are the counterpart to the large deficits in the United States. As Cathy
says, those are not desirable. But, in general, surpluses can be
sustained for a longer period of time than deficits.
In the case of Latin America, which is where at least my mind
spends a lot of time, the large surpluses that the region has been
running during the last few years—with the exception of two coun-
tries (Mexico and Colombia)—are a result of the de-leveraging of
Latin America, which had run very large external debts. Presumably,
that process will come to an end, and Latin America, at some point
in the next few years, will become once again a region that is a recip-
ient of positive foreign savings. That, of course, is going to be part of
the adjustment, and capital flows presumably will go back to the
region. How Asia will contribute to this is an open question and one
that maybe we can discuss further.
Mr. Fraga: Congratulations, Sebastian, for a very nice paper. There
are a couple things I wanted to suggest or ask.
290 Chair: Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.
 One, it would be interesting to see if there are any cases of countries
that had large current account deficits for a number of years and did
not adjust abruptly, perhaps countries that went through an invest-
ment boom, as the models would suggest, that worked out smoothly.
The other question that you discussed and that we think about all
the time is whether the United States will adjust in an abrupt fashion
or not. Here, my second point is that perhaps we could draw on the
lessons from the crisis literature of the last 20 years or so. That brings
to mind a couple issues. One is on the asset side of the equation—
where the money went. That has never really led to very good
empirical results. It is still intuitively clear that in the case of the
United States, where most of the money seems to have been corre-
lated with an increase in consumption, one has to worry. But, more
important than that, in my experience both as a policymaker and as
a market practitioner, is the liability side.
It would be interesting, in the case of the United States, to look at
the funding of the current account. There, we see some signs that
deserve some concern. First, one has the impression—and I haven’t
done the work in precise fashion—that the funding of the U.S.
current account deficit is getting shorter in its maturity. Also, we see
that the foreign direct investment numbers have turned negative.
A lot of people analyze a balance-of-payments situation like this by
adding the current account deficit and foreign direct investment to
see how much you need in financing. And that points to some
tension in the American case.
Ms. Krueger: This is a good paper, and certainly the crisis scenario
is at least a sufficient possibility, so we should look at it. As Edwards
himself said and everybody recognizes, if the current account imbal-
ances are going to lead to that, it could be a matter of years. It is not
imminent. In the meantime, the big danger of the current account
deficit and related items is, of course, mounting protectionist pres-
sure. I would have thought that, in terms of worrying about the
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 deficits, the danger would come from increased protectionism well
before the risk of any kind of financial crisis.
Mr. Iwata: I want to make one comment on the prescription to cure
the U.S. current account imbalance. One main message of the Obst-
feld and Rogoff paper, which is very interesting, is the importance of
resource reallocation between tradable goods and nontradable goods.
That implies the United States should allocate more resources to the
tradable sector. But, unfortunately, the tradable sector is dominated by
the manufacturing sector, where the United States does not have a
strong comparative advantage. I think it will be difficult for the United
States to remarkably expand its manufacturing activity over the future.
The best thing to do, then, is to expand the international trade of
services where the United States has a comparative advantage. There-
fore, it is extremely important for the United States to promote the
liberalization process in the service trade within the framework of the
WTO, which is going on now. In order to prevent the explosive devel-
opment of net foreign debt to nominal GNP ratio, the current
account deficit, in terms of nominal GDP, must be reduced to about
3 percent, given the current level of 30 percent, net the foreign debt-
GDP ratio that was shown in Edwards’ paper. To expand the 3 percent
of nominal GDP in U.S. export of services seems challenging.
However, I find it seems to be a more promising way to tackle this
issue of U.S. current account deficit rather than relying on curtailing
the consumer spending in the United States or expecting a rapid
growth rate abroad.
Mr. Martin Perez Redrado: Let me praise Sebastian Edwards for a
very thorough, in-depth analysis and empirical capacity. You continue
to raise standards for all of us Latin American economists.
I would like to follow up on the issue of trade liberalization and its
impact over the world imbalances. My main concern is the lack of
conceptual linkages between trade and finance that we find in academic
analyses and in policymaking. I am convinced that a successful 
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 Doha Round could be a major contribution in solving the issues
discussed in this session. Let’s look at the case of services where the
opening up of sectors like banking, telecommunications, or transporta-
tion will greatly benefit the developed economies. But also let me
mention the case of industrial goods. We have bound tariffs in the
WTO of 35 percent. Around a third of emerging market countries
don’t have bound tariffs since the Uruguay Round, so they can do
whatever they like with tariffs.
A round of trade liberalization that will include improved market
access for industrial goods and services should clearly help to correct
the imbalances in the United States and to minimize the adjustment
costs. However, the gatekeeper for a trade liberalization round is agri-
culture. Protectionism in agriculture involves three key elements:
export subsidies, domestic support, and tariffs. There are two main
issues—export subsidies, which, in my view, is the first of the sins in
international trade, and domestic support. There are also two impor-
tant players—the United States and the European Union. 
There doesn’t seem to be the dynamics either in academia or at the
policymaking level required to push the round forward in order to
make it successful. When we run general equilibrium models for
Latin America simulating what trade liberalization could do in terms
of lowering barriers, we reach impressive conclusions: an annual
increase in GDP of around 8 percent and an increase in trade of
around 28 percent. 
General equilibrium models used for developed economies
combining market access, liberalization for agriculture, industry, and
services show remarkable improvements in social welfare globally.
Therefore, a successful round of trade liberalization could be a key
element in correcting the imbalances. Further academic research and
policymakers’ emphasis is needed to bring momentum to trade liber-
alization in order to contain growing pressures toward protectionism.
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 Mr. Crockett: One of the things that was said yesterday is that the
United States is different because it is big. That is a fundamental
difference, not just because of the so-called exorbitant privilege, but
because you have to see the determination of the U.S. balance of
payments accounts, and their adjustment, in a general equilibrium
context, bringing in the rest of the world.
It is relatively easy, in broad terms, to describe what an adjustment
has to involve. It has to involve an increase in savings relative to
investment in the United States, a decline in savings relative to invest-
ment in the rest of the world, and a movement in the exchange rate
that allows the current accounts to accommodate to the changed
savings-investment patterns.
That can happen smoothly, if each of these three developments
occurs gradually and simultaneously. The risks are either that they
happen too rapidly or they do not happen simultaneously.
If the U.S. savings rate starts to rise before spending increases else-
where, clearly we have recessionary tendencies. Similarly, there will be
disruptive adjustments if portfolio shifts cause the exchange rate to
move before savings investment balances change. There is a lot that
can be said on that. I’ll say that will call for a lot of careful central
bank coordination in what has been termed “the mopping up phase.”
Mr. Berner: I will make just two quick points. One, for any of the
panelists, who will bear the burden of adjustment when and if the U.S.
current account begins to adjust? It seems to me that potentially if U.S.
demand growth shrinks, some of our major trading partners may bear
more of the burden of adjustment than would the United States.
Second, and related to something Arminio Fraga raised, perhaps we
all think about exchange rate changes and their effects both on U.S.
exports and U.S. imports. We haven’t seen much effect on U.S.
imports because, as Edwards acknowledged, many exporters to the
United States price to the market and that has long been the case.
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 Perhaps foreign-direct investment into the United States and the
production that brings—the substitution that will bring in imports—
is really the answer to that substitution.
Mr. Goldstein: I wanted to ask Sebastian Edwards to elaborate on
his finding that when you get a current account reversal for large
industrial countries, you also get exchange rate depreciation and a fall
in economic growth. If that were to happen in a U.S. current account
reversal, how will U.S. economic growth fall? Since the United States
has very little foreign-currency denominated debt, there is no
balance-sheet effect to be contractionary. A dollar depreciation also
would improve U.S. net exports, which would be expansionary. So, it
would seem to follow that the mechanism for inducing a fall in U.S.
economic growth would have to be a rise in long-term U.S. interest
rates. But there is also the finding in Joe Gagnon’s recent paper
(coming out of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors) that when
you witness currency depreciation for industrial countries, long-term
bond yields don’t go up unless there is a threat of inflation.
This suggests to me that two scenarios could be part of the story.
Scenario one: go to the middle of next year (2006) and assume there
is no excess capacity left in the U.S. economy. If you then get a large
depreciation of the dollar, the resulting shift in demand toward U.S.
goods produces an inflationary threat. The Fed then has to raise short-
term U.S. interest rates by a lot, and some of that spills over into
higher long-term rates. Scenario two is the risk premium argument.
Assume there is little progress in reducing the U.S. current account
imbalance, slow domestic demand growth in Europe, and very limited
exchange rate flexibility in Asia. You could then get protectionist forces
growing stronger in the United States and elsewhere, and this could
put a premium in U.S. long-term interest rates that comes on top of
the effects of U.S. monetary tightening. In any case, I would be inter-
ested in the panelists’ views on how long-term interest rates in the
United States go up in the reduced U.S. economic growth scenario. 
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 Mr. Levy: Just a point on sustainability: We need to consider that
in the last 15 years, U.S. economic growth has consistently exceeded
the euro zone by a wide margin and Japan by an even wider margin.
If you look at the U.S. growth in capital spending relative to other
industrialized countries, its magnitude is larger. And, if we believe in
international trade and capital flows, aren’t the wide trade and
current account deficits in the United States a reflection of what is
going on? In particular, I would note that if we look at the compo-
sition of U.S. imports, about 40 percent are industrial supplies and
capital goods, even excluding petroleum. This suggests that the
strong U.S. economy and the fact that capital spending is rising so
rapidly are among the causes of the wide trade deficit and current
account. If the United States continues to outperform the economies
of other industrial nations and if expected rates of return are higher,
doesn’t this imply that the trade and current account imbalances are
sustainable longer than currently expected?
Mr. Barnes: The papers do a good job of telling us the economic
consequences of current account reversals. We all understand what
needs to happen in terms of savings, investment adjustments, and
exchange rates. I would like to ask the panelists if any work has been
done on analyzing the triggers for the changes that are required, that
is to say, whether we can make any generalizations about whether it is
domestic policy actions or the actions of external investors. Not the
consequences and causes, but the triggers for current account changes. 
Ms. Mann: There are many different questions and comments. I
will focus my comments mainly on the topic of tradable services, first
their potential to change the trajectory for the trade deficit, and
second, the status of services negations in the WTO. I also will make
a comment about trade in manufactured products. 
On services, just as well as goods, it is important to disaggregate. In
Edwards’ paper, the aggregated services trade surplus falls. However,
disaggregating services trade reveals a worsening of the trade position
in transportation, travel, and military transfers, but a continued posi-
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 tive and increasing trade balance in “other private services,” such as
professional, technical, financial, and education services. 
Trade elasticities for these other private services are different from
that for goods. A number of years ago, I estimated the elasticities of
U.S. demand for tradable services and foreign demand for tradable
services. What was unique about tradable services at the time, which
has been confirmed since in recent work by Jaime Marquez at the
Board of Governors, was that the elasticity of foreign demand for
tradable services (U.S. exports) is much higher than is the case for
U.S. demand for tradable services (U.S. imports). Unlike goods in
which the familiar Houthakker-Magee asymmetry puts us at a disad-
vantage (that is, if every country grows at the same rate, we would run
a larger and larger trade deficit), the opposite is true for services,
particularly these so-called other private services. In fact, the esti-
mated elasticities reveal that a common growth rate around the world
should expand our services surplus. 
Unfortunately, a rapid expansion of U.S. exports of services is not
likely in the future since the services sectors are the ones where the
least progress has been made in previous trade rounds. Moreover,
negotiations on services in the Doha Round are at a standstill. So,
although services trade offers an avenue to potentially change the
trajectory of the trade deficit and aid sustainability, it is not likely to
do so. 
A second comment is with regard to trade in manufactured goods.
In contrast to one comment, U.S. manufacturing remains very inter-
nationally competitive. Despite slow growth in the major industrial
country markets, and an extended period of dollar appreciation,
exports of capital goods and industrial supplies and materials account
for almost half of all exports of goods and services.
Mr. Eichengreen: To Morris Goldstein, who asked and answered: It
is my worry that it is going to be the interest rate increase that brings
about the painful adjustment. Gagnon’s results really don’t speak
directly to this issue because they don’t distinguish different reasons
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 why the exchange rate moves. Different causes will result in different
interest rate responses. If there is a sudden curtailment of financing, it
is pretty clear which way the U.S. Treasury bond yield is going to move.
To Anne Krueger: I worry about the trade protection response as
well. I don’t think redoubling our efforts on trade liberalization, on
the other hand, is going to solve the U.S. current account imbalance,
which is a macro phenomenon of savings and investment grown
largely at home.
Finally, could there be a smooth adjustment of this imbalance? My
view yesterday and, of course, still now is the longer it continues, the
less plausible that scenario becomes. The larger the U.S. debt relative
to global portfolios, the less plausible sustainability appears.
A final point would be to try to bring this back to our discussion of
what a risk management-oriented central bank might do or maybe
should have done about this problem. One option would have been
to ignore it. A second option would have been to argue longer and
louder about the need for fiscal correction to raise national savings as
the imbalance began to emerge. And a third option, which someone
at this conference ought to put on the table, would have been to
normalize the level of interest rates more rapidly starting in 2002 as a
way of addressing this emerging risk.
Mr. Edwards: Arminio Fraga asked a very important question and
that is whether we have seen a more orderly adjustment. Both meas-
ures I use are a 5 percent reduction over three years. Now, you may
think that is abrupt, but in one of the measures I use, the first year is
only 2 percent, so it would be like 2, 2, 1 percent or 2, 1, 2 percent
or whatever. That is pretty gradual.
The consequences on growth in my results are that the negative conse-
quences are smaller for the smoother adjustment than for the more
abrupt reduction. If you continue to look at more and more gradual
definitions of reversal, the negative effect will become smaller and
smaller until it will disappear. The very fine paper done at the Board of
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 Govenors by Croke, Kamin, and Leduc takes the definition of reversal
that is quite mild (2 percent over three years), and in that case, they don’t
find a negative effect on growth. This is not the kind of adjustment we
are talking about here. So, it is a very important question.
On the fact that foreign direct investment has become negative, I
worry a little bit, but not too much. It is a two-and-a-half-year trend,
which may revert in the future.
Many of the comments have to do with protectionism, and I am
very concerned as well. I just want to point out that one of the inter-
esting results of this research is that the effects on growth of a reversal
become smaller in more open economies. Not only will this help the
adjustment, but also, once the reversal comes, the data show that
more open economies are able to rebound faster.
The risk management theme that we discussed yesterday will
become very important, but not only from the point of view of the
Fed. It will require risk management in a coordinated fashion across
a number of central banks. Here, it is not going to be the G7 only. If
one looks at the trade-weighted real exchange rate for the United
States, which is calculated by the Fed, it has 26 currencies. The first
five currencies include the Mexican peso and the Chinese Yuan. 
Finally, Morris Goldstein asked a question and provided the answer.
It will be interest rates. In my results adjusted for large countries,
there is an increase in interest rates of 120 basis points associated with
the reversals. If we add to that the type of risk premium increases that
we have talked about, that increase may be quite significant, and that
is something that we should be concerned about. 
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